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Grammaticalization, polysemy and




1 Shall and should are two word-forms of the same verbal lexeme shall with a wide range of
uses and meanings in contemporary English. This polysemy has been analysed in previous
research  (Arigne,  1984,  1989)  in  terms  of  semantic  derivation.  The  basic  working
assumption of the analysis is that distinct modal meanings generate one another. The
hypothesis  is  given  support  by  etymological,  diachronic  and  psychogenetic
considerations (Onions, 1966, Klein, 1966, Behre, 1950 Piéraut-Le Bonniec, 19741) as well
as  the  existence  of  very  strong  constraints  in  contemporary  usage  notably  in
interrogative  contexts.  It  should  be  noted  that  views  based  on  the  same  kind  of
hypothesis have been expressed by other authors, either on specific questions or from a
general standpoint (Traugott, 1974, 1989, Sweetser, 1986, 1990 among many others). On
the basis  of  the theoretical  principle of  semantic generation,  the analysis  proposes a
unified approach of the verbal lexeme shall which is grounded on the isolation of small
meaning units defined in relational terms. The various meanings of shall and should are
accordingly related to a primary etymological pre-auxiliary meaning in which the verb
sceal has the meaning of the contemporary verb owe and governs a nominal as direct
object.  A  subject-subject  relation  defines  the  original  meaning  or  valeur-origine from
which all other meanings are derived (Arigne, 1984, 1989). This article re-examines the
results of  this research in the light of  grammaticalization and,  more specifically,  the
processes of grammaticalization identified and discussed in the literature. It emphasises
the role played by various processes that are together at work in iterated modality, while
underlining the fact that the same processes can be found in the synchronic study of
contemporary  uses  of  should,  which  retain  traces  of  the  way  they  were  historically
constructed. 
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II. Grammaticalization in independent clauses and
subordinate clauses not governed by a verb (such as
comparative clauses)
II. 1. From lexical meaning to deontic and epistemic modality
II. 1. 1. From lexical meaning to deontic and epistemic modality: from < S → S > to
< S → S > and < S → P >2
2 The study  of  deontic  shall shows  how a  syntactic  construction gave  way  to  another
through reanalysis and metaphorical  transfer (Arigne,  1984,  1989).  The contemporary
construction shall do something originates in a sequence like *shall something which used to
mean owe something3. The verb owe means “have from somebody” (cp. debere < de habere
in Latin (Ernout et Meillet, 1932) and can accordingly be construed as the localisation of
an object, that which is owed, in reference to two subjects, the S who owes and the S to
whom the object is owed4. Two semantic features can be analysed in this first meaning:
two subjects are related and the subject who owes,  for example at the present time,
contemplates his  own deprivation of  the object  at  some time in the future.  In other
words,  the  meaning  associated  with  the  present  form of  shall (=  owe)  is  that  of  an
obligation to return an object at some time in the future, in which one can see an original
subject-subject relation noted < S → S > as well as an embryo of temporal future meaning.
Such a meaning gives semantic motivation to a first metaphorical  shift  in which the
nominal  (referring to the object  that is  to be returned) is  replaced by a verb in the
infinitive form5. In present-day English, the SS relation found in these owe-meanings of
shall is retained, but the presence of a verb instead of a nominal as the governed unit also
entails a subject-proposition (SP) relation, clearly apparent in assertive contexts:
(1) You shall go < S1 → S2 > and < S1 → P >
(2) It shall be done immediately < S1 → P >
3 Moreover, the presence of a verb apt to express temporal reference allows the formerly
embryonic future reference to develop more fully6. The two semantic units (SS relation,
SP relation) mentioned for shall are retained in the uses of deontic should, and the modal
use of the past tense adds an idea of possibility, as other subjects’ desires are being taken
into account: 
(3) You / he should go < S1 / Sx → S2 > and < S1 / Sx → P >
4 In  other  words,  S1  conceives  that  other  subjects,  including  S2,  may  have  a  desire
concerning S2 and P, and that this desire may be different from his own. You should go (as
opposed to you shall go) is therefore interpreted as I want you to go but I know that other
people (Sx) may feel differently about it: other desires are possible, hence other propositions
and  other  courses  of  action.  This  meaning  of  possibility  is  what  contributes  to  an
interpretation of such sentences as presenting P as the desirable thing to do or “le bon
choix”  (Arigne,  1984,  1989)  as  well  as  expressing “weak” obligation  (Rivière, 1981,
Arigne, 1984, 1989). With a meaning of possibility superimposed upon a deontic meaning,
two modal meanings are found together in the same use of the same unit should, thus
constituting an instance of iterated modality. 
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II. 1. 2. The epistemic meaning derives from the deontic meaning: from < S → S>
and < S → P > to < Q → P >
5 The epistemic meaning of should is semantically derived from the deontic one through
reanalysis. The deontic SS relation disappears and is replaced by a PP inferential relation,
through another metaphorical shift: S is replaced by P. The proposition P is inferred from
a  second  term which  can  take  the  form of  another  proposition  Q,  Q  being  what  is
supposed to make P possible: < Q → P>7. At the same time, the inference of P never goes
without  a  shade  of  deontic  or  evaluative  meaning,  which  can  be  written  as  above
< S → P >.  This  semantic  overlapping has  been noted by a  number of  authors  among
whom Leech (1971 / 1987: 100) who mentions “a favourable attitude”, Quirk et al. (1985:
227) who write that “the proposition […] is desirable” or Arigne (1984 and 1989: 186) who
comments  upon  the  relation  between  epistemic  inferential  meanings  and  evaluative
modality, and more specifically the desirable proposition, “la bonne relation prédicative”.
This type of semantic derivation finds support in data from historical linguistics since,
with the exception of  may,  “the deontic  meanings  of  the modals  are  older  than the




6 The first passage from lexical shall to deontic shall illustrates both processes of bleaching
and enrichment, as loss on one side is accompanied by gain on the other side. In other
words, desemanticization and resemanticization are two products of semantic derivation,
which  occur  as  new semantic  specialisations  are  found.  The  fact  that  one  syntactic
construction gives way to another leads to a change in scope and categories as a main
verb  becomes  an  auxiliary  verb.  In  the  auxiliary,  the  past  tense  adds  a  meaning  of
possibility to the deontic one of necessity, and the two meanings are present together in
deontic  should.  The  next  semantic  change,  which  goes  from  deontic  to  epistemic
meanings, is also accompanied by a measure of resemanticization, but never without a
strong persistence of  the older  meanings  through the persistence of  the idea of  the
desirable proposition, i.e. le bon choix. Evaluative modality, shown to be intimately related
to deontic modality in the case of deontic should, remains so with epistemic should. In
both cases, the semantic derivation is achieved through displacement or, in other words,
a metaphorical shift. As was noted with deontic should, the epistemic interpretations of
should combine the two meanings of possibility and necessity.
 
III. Meditative-polemic should9
III. 1. Negative contexts and reanalysis of a deontic
grammaticalized meaning: from < S → S > and < S → P > to
< P → S >
7 The  first  kind  of  context  which  is  going  to  be  examined  is  the  negative  one  of
superordinate expressions (SupExps) such as strange, in well-known examples like:
(4) It is strange that he should have done that.
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8 Throughout the following analysis  I  shall  assume for the sake of  simplicity that  this
example is a direct-speech sentence in which the speaker (S1) unambiguously expresses
his own feelings10.  Such contemporary usage is seen as retaining part of the semantic
features  analysed  in  the  first  cases  of  meditative-polemic  should which  appeared  in
history (Behre, 1950). The following lines present an analysis of those original features,
which must be seen as an underlying shade of meaning to be found in contemporary uses,
a more complete description of which will be given in the subsequent paragraphs. 
9 Such negative contexts can be analysed as illustrating a second metaphorical transfer, in
which the original SS relation is replaced by a PS relation. In this configuration, the shift
corresponds to the following semantic characteristics. First, S1 expresses annoyance at
the state of affairs or the idea of the event expressed in the subordinate clause (Behre,
1950).  Secondly,  P  is  viewed  as  expressing  a  feeling  of  “fatal  necessity”  (i.e.  the
propositional content of P was to happen; cf.  Behre, 1950) so that the thing or event
referred to by the proposition was originally felt as being imposed or imposing itself upon
the  subject.  One  can  then  imagine  a  metaphorical  mapping  of  an  SS  relation  into
< ? → P >, which would eventually lead to < ? → P → S > in which < ? → P > can be read
as “something causes P to happen / be and P is (felt as) imposed upon S and makes S
unhappy”. This conflict S / P is expressed in the SupExp through the adjective strange,
which can be interpreted as “different from P” or “not P”, thus construing it as a negative
expression11.  To  conclude,  should is  used  in  a  subordinate  clause  which  functions  as
subject in a complex sentence and the orientation of the relation is the opposite of what
is found in independent clauses (< S → P > ≠ < P → S >). This inverted relation enables one
to better understand what are often called “non-harmonic” uses and at the same time to
find some measure of harmony in them12. At this stage, it is important to note that Behre
(1950), analysing the origin of such uses of should, observes that shall was first used ca.
1300  with  “expressions  of  sorrow  and  displeasure”13 to  be  replaced  ca. 1400  by  a
generalised  use  of  should  and  that “meditative-polemic  should”  expresses  “mental
resistance”. Such mental resistance in contemporary meditative-polemic should is to be
attributed to shall, whereas the meditative element is most probably to be related to the
idea of possibility inherent in the past form should (see II. 1. 1. above) “when it was used
synchronously with shall” before shall became recessive.
10 An additional interpretation may also be found in the contemporary uses of meditative-
polemic  should.  It  corresponds  to  what  is  mentioned  in  Arigne  as  an  existential
predication  (“prédication  d’existence”),  paraphrased  as  < let P be >.  The  existential
predication is  reinforced and made more perceptible when the subordinate clause is
thematised (Arigne, 1984: 234, 1989: 197). I will draw here on this intuition and try to
expand it. This so‑called “existential predication”, having to do with “let P be”, amounts
in fact to expressing a degree of necessity of P. This element of necessity associated with
P  should  not  be  understood  as  the  necessity  of  the  event  itself  but  as  that  of  the
representation of the event14. The representation of an event constitutes another type of
entity, different from the event itself. This direction of research might account for the
fact that a number of these subordinate clauses are compatible with the noun fact (the fact
that they should have achieved…) as well as compatible, though not necessarily associated,
with actual events, since actualisation is by no means necessary for the use of should
(Arigne,  1989:  200‑201).  Indeed,  should seems  to  place  the  event  outside  temporal
contingencies as it manages to raise it to a higher level of representation. The proposition
P is no longer seen as solely referring to a propositional content or an event. It also refers
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to  another  kind  of  entity,  a  more  abstract  one,  which  is  the  proposition  itself  as  a
representation. With such a reflexive use, the proposition as such (i.e. understood as a
representation) comes under the scope of should. The original idea of fatal necessity is
here re-interpreted as a metalinguistic act, which posits the necessity of a proposition,
putting that of the actual event in the background. This is to be seen as a second, more
abstract,  interpretation of  the relation < ? → P >.  This  interpretation leaves  aside  the
subjective  emotional  part  of  the  previous  metaphorical  interpretation  < P → S >  and
posits P as necessary, inasmuch as it is an abstract representation and therefore a support
for  evaluation  or  other  kinds  of  modal  judgments  (see  also  infra  in  the  following
sections).
11 Such analysis sheds a new light on and gives stronger support to labels such as “putative
should”  (Quirk  et  al.,  1985,  among  many  others)  or  “theoretical  meaning”
(Leech, 1971 / 1987).  The idea of  “theoretical  meaning” is  taken up by many authors
among whom Paillard (1984) and Bernard (1992), who address the issue of the English
subjunctive.  They mention the absence of  a mark of  endorsement of  the predication
(“relation prédicative sans trace de prise en charge de l’énonciateur”, Bernard, 1992: 20),
or a minimal degree of determination concerning the predicative relation (“un degré
minimal de la détermination de la relation prédicative”, Paillard, 1984: 77). Mélis (1998),
studying the question of the should‑subjunctive, follows the same line of argument with
“l’idée  du  fait”  (109),  which  he  reformulates  subsequently  as  a  reference  to  the
representation of the fact (“référence non au fait lui-même mais à sa représentation”,
Mélis, 1998: 117). Chuquet also quotes Leech and establishes a parallel between for…to 
infinitive constructions and that…should constructions (1986: 45)15. 
 
III. 2. Grammaticalization
12 This third occurrence of reanalysis through a metaphorical shift is accompanied by a
measure  of  bleaching  as  the  original  deontic  meaning  is  immersed  in  an  evaluative
domain. The evaluative character is in such cases attested by the semantic type of the
SupExp exemplified in those sentences. What we have here is first a meaning of mental
resistance  (Behre,  1950)  showing  another  change  in  scope  and  categories.  The
“deontic” meaning  originates  in  the  propositional  content  of  the  subordinate  clause,
which annoys a subject, just as another subject’s desire(s) went against his feelings with
deontic should. The thing or event referred to in the subordinate clause can thereby be
seen as  exerting  some kind of  constraint  on the  subject,  who expresses  his  feelings
through a SupExp containing a negative adjective (strange, unbelievable…). Secondly, we
find an existential metalinguistic meaning which posits the necessity of P as a proposition
so  that  it  can  be  used  as  a  support  for  modal  judgment,  reaching  another  level  of
abstraction in grammaticalization and a further change in categories. Thirdly, the notion
of possibility given by the past tense is one element among others which allows one to
consider P and non‑P (other elements being the SupExp itself and, in some cases, the
suffix –able of the adjective as for example in unbelievable, inconceivable…), a feature which
will  be  fully  exploited  in  other  contexts  seen  in  III.  4.16,  allowing  a  “meditative”
interpretation. 
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III. 3. Generalisation to other contexts
13 This use of should is extended to other superordinate contexts through analogy (Meillet,
1912 / 1982).  Such a process of analogy preserves the original process at work in the
complex sentence (III. 1. and 2.), so that the two processes of layering and persistence
(Hopper, 1991, Peyraube, 2002) combine to account for all  the other uses of should in
subject nominal that‑clauses. The first negative context is retained in all other subsequent
uses in comparable contexts, whether positive or negative. The other contexts are built
on top of  the first  one,  which remains  present  as  a  first  ground layer:  the negative
meaning of the first layer is thus incorporated into the meanings of the other contexts.
The  two  principles  of  layering  and  persistence  considered  to  account  for  distinct
meanings of a word or even distinct linguistic items “within a broad functional domain”
(Hopper, 1991: 22)17 therefore co‑exist when should occurs in one particular syntactic and
semantic context, that is to say when should is associated with one and the same SupExp.
As  we shall  see,  this  multiplicity  of  layers  can be made explicit  through a semantic
analysis of evaluative contexts: adjectives and, more generally, SupExps pertaining to the
superordinate clause proper, as well as discourse markers and sometimes the discursive
context outside the sentence. 
 
III. 4. Positive contexts
14 I shall here distinguish between three kinds of positive contexts. The first are, of course,
positive  contexts  more  or  less  based  on  the  negation  of  the  first  negative  SupExps
examined in III. 1. like not strange, normal, understandable…, the latter two being directive
contexts  with SupExps  containing adjectives  like  necessary, appropriate,  desirable… and
emotional contexts in which are listed adjectives such as fortunate or lucky.
15 A subsequent  natural  step after  a  negative  reaction is  the  attempt  to  overcome the
negative feeling experienced (dissatisfaction, reluctance, incomprehension) and to find
reasons to accept the fact or idea with which one finds oneself in conflict. The speaker
tries to relate the propositional content of P felt to be the source of discomfort or the
cause of conflict, to another unmentioned fact or idea, which could constitute the content
of another proposition Q.  This step does not obliterate the first stage of the train of
thought which was pure rejection of P, so that we find a tendency to indicate, or just hint
at, in context or discourse, the relation to the original negative context: but…, (conceivable)
after all, only (fair), quite (normal), perfectly (understandable)… as can be seen in the examples
below:
(5) I recalled that one day long ago Jocas had asked me, as a personal favour, to
allow his tailor to take my measurements: and though puzzled, I had complied. […]
… this small trifle had hardly seemed worth troubling about. Now I understood. […]
It was perfectly understandable, I told myself, that I should dress appropriately, to
match my new, my enormous salary … (L. Durrell, 1968, Tunc)
(6) But it’s good that someone should have illusions. (in Behre, 1955: 23)
16 A similarly multilayered analysis holds for the next two kinds of positive contexts, e.g.
directive and emotional ones. The class of directive SupExps comprises expressions like
necessary,  indispensable,  vital… or fair,  fitting,  appropriate…  as well as  advisable,  desirable…
These directive contexts, whose prototype I here take to be the adjective necessary, can be
construed  as  double  negatives,  necessary being  thereby  analysed  as  equivalent  to
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“impossible that not”. Consequently, I regard the sentences containing these SupExps as
an extension of the use of should in negative contexts like strange or inconceivable, still
preserving the original negative meaning born from the relation < P → S > (cf. Arigne,
1984, 1989). Three types of argument can be put forward in favour of this analysis, which
relate to etymology, semantics and ultimately the relation between syntax and semantics.
If one takes a closer look at the etymology of necessary,  one sees that the Latin word
necesse can be interpreted as “impossible to go backwards / to back out” (Ernout and
Meillet, 1932: 434)18. This definition is actually clearly built on two negatives, the first
being the prefix im‑, the second being marked by back and out, which from a localistic
point of view indicates through a spatial metaphor that the outer part, as opposed to the
inner part, of a thing is its negative counterpart (see for example Culioli, 1976 / 1990,
1981 / 1990, 1988 / 1990 and 1997). Likewise, indispensable is defined as that cannot be done
without (Onions, 1966), a definition in which ‑out and not are the two negative markers.
Secondly, some SupExps like good, fitting, appropriate, right, just, fair… and others exhibit a
certain degree of semantic ambiguity insofar as they can be construed as directive as well
as  evaluative,  the  directive  interpretation  being  entailed  by,  or  inferred  from,  the
evaluative expression of a norm. This is the case of example (6) supra, as it is here in:
(7) It would seem only fair that he should return the favour later. (BNC)
17 This example contrasts with the use of should in the following example in which fair,
occurring with not and so, is clearly open to the sole evaluative interpretation:
(8)  …she fiercely  told  herself  that  it  wasn’t  fair  that  her  life  now should  be  so
miserable and exhausting. (BNC)
18 Lastly, the third type of argument is that the syntactic construction < P is Adj > in which P
functions as subject is different from that in which P functions as object. An adjective like
necessary does not explicitly present the volition or desire of any particular subject, but is
a means whereby the speaker posits P as being the thing to be desired by all subjects,
which makes this kind of adjective both evaluative (just as evaluative as strange or good)
and omni‑personal. In other words, the will that…should… is semantically different from …
imperative that… should… This can be illustrated by the following examples in which S urged
that… should… in (9), or S be urgent that… in (10), totally differs from it be urgent that…
should… in example (11):
(9) He urged that a review procedure should be devised. (BNC)
(10)  Mrs  Travers  […]  was  most  urgent  that  I  should  endeavour  to  persuade Mr
Little’s cook to leave Mr Little’s service. And join her staff. (P. G. Wodehouse, 1925,
Carry on, Jeeves)
(11) It is urgent that the patient should get to hospital. (Thomson & Martinet, 1960,
A Practical English Grammar)
19 The same view is  taken by Cotte (1988:  818)  who remarks that  the commonly called
directive  SupExps  are  in  fact  evaluative  comments19.  So  are  adjectives  like  advisable,
preferable, desirable… though it is more difficult to argue for a double negative analysis
from a lexical semantics point of view. Still,  one can observe two things.  First,  these
adjectives share the possibility of temporal (future) and modal (intentional) meanings
with double negative SuExps such as necessary, and secondly they are adjectives with an
evaluative  meaning,  so  that  a  derived  adjective  like  desirable is  different  from  the
inflected  verbal  participle  desired20.  I  can  only  tentatively  suggest  that  analogy  with
SupExps like necessary may have operated here, maybe reinforced by analogy with plain
directive  constructions  (S  demanded  that…  should…),  this  analogy  being  shared  by
adjectives such as necessary.  Finally,  the third and last  kind of  positive contexts,  e.g.
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positive emotional ones, is constituted by adjectives such as touching, lucky and the like,
which always imply the idea that P is in some way unbelievable, or “too good to be true”
(Behre, 1955: 144):
(12) It’s so touching and flattering that he should have come.
20 As was  the case with SupExps like  good or  appropriate,  some of  these  adjectives  or
SupExps like wonderful, remarkable, extraordinary, striking are ambiguous, since they
also  qualify  as  negative  contexts  (cf.  III.  1.  above),  which  makes  them  particularly
compatible with this semantically stratified use of should. 
 
III. 5. Grammaticalization
21 These new occurrences are clear examples of extension through analogy based on partial
semantic structural identity. The meaning of should can be said to be even more bleached,
in a possibly opaque but still elaborate way, as the bleaching is due to the layering which
pushes the original semantic content < P → S > further into the distance, but manages to
keep it somehow in sight through persistence within the same use of should. The first
layer  provides  the  undertone  of  mental  resistance  in  addition  to  the  existential
metalinguistic meaning, while the meaning of possibility, taking both P and non‑P into
consideration, may well be what allows the maintaining of this first layer together with
the building of an evaluative opposite meaning on top of it. SupExps like not strange or
normal are used in addition to those on the pattern of strange. Behre (1950: 284) mentions
the “adaptability to both old and new purposes” of should,  which may have been the
reason  why  over  time  it  was  preferred  to  shall.  Because  of  this  superimposition  of
meanings  in  a  multistratal  construction,  it  also  exemplifies  a  clear  case  of  iterated
modality. 
 
III. 6. Emotional and intellectual uses of meditative-polemic should
III. 6. 1. Emotional uses and exclamative sentences: that it should come to that!
22 Exclamative  sentences  contain  no  SupExps  and  can  be  easily  linked  to  the  negative
contexts seen in III. It should be remembered that the two cases were the first historical
uses of shall in that-clauses, which later gave way to “meditative‑polemic should” (Behre,
1950). In these instances of should, the emotion felt is too strong for the speaker to find
words to express any judgment on P (for a more detailed description, see Arigne, 1984,
1989).
 
III. 6. 2. The “intellectual” uses: that…should…means that…
23 In this type of sentence, P is related to a second term, which typically takes the form of
another clause so that the structure encountered here is, basically, an inter-propositional
relation < P ← Q >. The first reaction of rejection is overcome. The annoying content of
the  that-clause  is  related to  another  term which accounts  for  it,  hence allowing the
affected subject to better accept it. We have seen (III. 3. 1.) a first stage of this attempt at
finding some reason or explanation for P, through which the subject’s annoyance could
be somehow alleviated.  A reason was  found but  was  never  made explicit  within the
sentence  (Arigne,  1984,  1989).  It  must  be  underlined  that,  in  all  cases,  those  more
intellectual uses take P as a starting point to reach a second term Q but never follow the
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opposite direction.  This means that the piece of reasoning goes “upwards”,  from the
consequence P to the cause or principle Q that accounts for P, in an inductive way. In fact,
all contemporary occurrences are in some way an answer to the question contained in
Chaucer’s following lines: “…by my hat! / That men shulde alwey loven, causeles, / Who can a
reson finde or wit in that?” (Chaucer, quoted in Behre, 1950: 294; see also Arigne, 1989, note
5)21. This can be seen in the two examples below in which the terms proves and typical of
connect P to a second term Q:
(14) … the fact that they should have rallied round him in this crisis proves that
there must have been something likeable about the man. (in Behre, 1955: 68)
(15) It is typical of the cynicism of fate that he should imagine he loved me and still
does. (L. Durrell, 1968, Tunc)
 
III. 6. 3. More sophisticated negative contexts: insignificant, irrelevant < P ← no Q >
24 The construction of an inductive piece of reasoning yields more sophisticated negative
contexts than those described in III. 5. 2. as is shown by a sentence like:
(16) That he should have got up in the middle of the night is irrelevant.
25 In this example, another stratum is added, the speaker saying that there is no such thing
as  a  second term Q which P  could  be  referred  to,  and therefore  accounted for  and
eventually  accepted.  Here  we  have  a  new,  more  sophisticated  and  elaborate  way  of
expressing rejection, which is different from strange or revolting, thereby creating new
negative contexts. From what is a simpler expression of a negative emotion (strange), one
reaches something which might be felt as identical to this original stratum, but which in
fact is  different since it  contains this first  stratum upon which it  is  built,  as well  as
additional strata corresponding to the attempt at finding an explanatory term Q and the
failure in finding this term Q. This case illustrates a spiralling movement (cf. Culioli, 1968,
Peyraube, 2002)22 such as that referred to by Culioli  as a cam-structure, whereby one
returns to a point which bears some resemblance to the starting-point but is in fact not
identical with it, being of a different make-up23.
 
III. 7. Grammaticalization
26 Section III has given us the opportunity to see a multistratal construction, the several
stages  of  which show a clear  linguistic  instance of  layering and persistence at  work
together within the same use and meaning. Again, we see how a superimposition of modal
meanings, or in other words, iterated modality, is conducive to richer, though sometimes
rather elusive, meanings. From a stage where the thing or event referred to by P can be
seen as exerting some kind of constraint on S (III. 2.),  we reach a stage in which the
existence of P is constrained by another term which is perceived as the cause of P. Adding
up new layers may seem conducive to a bleaching effect. First of all, the meaning is not
easily accessible on account of the first inverted relation (actual desemanticization) and
also, the first two layers at work in the meditative process are contradictory: P is difficult
to  accept,  but  on  second  thoughts  understandable  and  therefore  acceptable.
Resemanticization is in fact achieved through contradiction, thereby leading to a blurring
of meanings and partial invisibility24. In the last case (III. 5. 3.), a spiralling movement
takes us back to what seems to be a former simpler case (such as can be seen with strange
in III. 1.), but is in fact constructed differently, as it takes into account a possible second
term Q which might have been a reason to accept P. 
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IV. Meditative-polemic should, iterated modality and
discourse
IV. 1. Preliminaries
27 In the present section dedicated to the way iterated modality is exploited in the use of
meditative-polemic should in discourse, I wish to make preliminary observations upon
what is understood, in depth, by the term “iterated modality”, and also to present in
more detail some finer descriptions given by Behre on meditative-polemic should.
28 Iterated modality is an issue that is much debated in modal logic and linguistics. In the
latter case, the literature often concerns itself with the question of embedded modalities25
.  The  question  of  embedded  modalities  is  exemplified  either  by  cases  of  explicitly
embedding syntax like it  is  possible  that  you will  have to… or by cases of  single verbal
sequences such as you may have to… where modality is iterated in one and the same clause.
In  both  cases,  the  term  refers  to  distinct  modal  meanings  instantiated  in  distinct
corresponding word-forms: a meaning of possibility marked by possible or may,  and a
meaning of  necessity expressed by have to.  The usage I  make of  the term is  slightly
different. I use it to refer to cases in which at least two distinct modal meanings are found
together, encapsulated as it were in the use of the same word-form. For example, should
in you should go (II. 1. 1.) is interpreted as expressing two different modal meanings, one
pertaining  to  the  domain  of  necessity,  and  the  other  to  the  domain  of  possibility.
Similarly,  in …natural  that…should…,  one can find a positive evaluative modal meaning
built on top of a negative one (III. 4.).  More generally,  it  should be noted that modal
meanings do not have to pertain to different modal domains or even, within the same
domain, to be different, to make modal iteration possible, as, for example, in it might be
possible that…
29 The adjective “meditative-polemic” was coined by Behre to describe the uses of should
examined in section III. The term “meditative” is justified by he fact that the use of should
is  associated with a  “contemplative attitude” towards P (1955:  147)  and “creates  the
impression that the writer is dwelling on a proposition which is familiar to the reader”
(1955: 158). On the other hand, the label “polemic” is linked to the fact that should is in
this case used “to bring the hearer to the speaker’s way of thinking” (1955: 146), because
the speaker “may be anticipating some sort of reluctance in the mind of the hearer to
accept the proposition” (1955:  149).  The meditative side of  should is  used to soften a
potential conflict: it “contributes to […] easing the tension in the mind of the hearer”
(1955: 163). “When resistance of some kind is anticipated in the mind of the reader or
some other person(s), the should-clause, on account of its meditative aspect, provides a
psychological meeting-ground for the parties concerned in the matter” (1955: 178). This
analysis may be easily related to what has been said above, and more particularly to the
existence of a first negative ground layer on the one hand, and to the idea of possibility
on the other  hand which is  compatible  with the positing of  contradictory meanings
through iterated modality.
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IV. 2. Iterated modality
IV. 2. 1. How iterated modality is expressed.
30 Iterated modality is expressed in should complement clauses associated with a certain
kind of SupExp, an adjective like understandable being different from a plain evaluative
adjective like strange,  and also sometimes with discourse markers within the sentence
such as after all, of course, yet…, or outside the sentence. The successive layers can be made
explicit, showing the semantic relation and progression between different SupExps, as
one type of evaluation leads to another in the course of meditation. This process is to be
seen in a variety of cases, whether the example, like (17), does not associate should with
the expression of one of the layers identified in the train of thought or whether it does, as
in examples (18) and (19)26:
(17)  …  though  it  was  almost  inconceivable  that  he  should  have  anything  very
special to tell us about Iolanthe, it was only fair to let Julia satisfy his curiosity.
(L. Durrell, 1970, Nunquam)
(18) She received the stockings from Beulah with her usual cheerfulness, for she
would have thought it quite shocking as Mrs Haddington that she would be idle.
‘Well, it wouldn’t be right, would it?’ she said. ‘For she pays me for my time, and it’s
only to be expected I should be working while I’m here’. (G. Heyer, 1951, Duplicate
Death)
(19)  It  was  odd but  somewhat  typical  of  Bernie  that he should have retained a
dogged  and  invincible  optimism  about  the  business…  (P. D. James,  1972,  An
Unsuitable Job for a Woman)
31 Here, attention must be drawn to the great flexibility of the SupExp, which may exhibit a
wide range of modulations testifying to the process of iterated modality. Modality must
be here understood in its broadest sense (see for example Culioli, 1976: 69), so that any
attitude of the speaker towards a propositional content is viewed as modalisation. We
have seen a first instance of this kind of modulation in example (8) with the combined use
of would and only (it would seem only fair), but one can also find other kinds expressed, for
example, through the use of the interrogative form, verbs of propositional attitude such
as  may,  seem,  think,  or  simply  the  use  of  not.  We  therefore  find  SupExps  which  are
syntactically and semantically more complex than it is fair such as is it fair that…?, it was/ it
may appear necessary, it may seem strange/ he might have thought it strange that… etc., as is to
be seen in the following examples:
(8)  …she fiercely  told  herself  that  it  wasn’t  fair  that  her  life  now should  be  so
miserable and exhausting. (BNC)
(20) What did it matter that she should have her secrets? (L. Durrell, 1968, Tunc)
(21)  Is  it  imperative  that  the  tragic  sense  should  reside  after  all  somewhere  in
laughter? (L. Durrell, 1970, Nunquam)
(22) But is it fair, when the integrity of the Prime Minister is at stake, that he should
have been able to select his referee? (Newstatesman, 16 February 2004)27
32 The use of not has already been mentioned when a sequence like not strange was listed
with understandable in the first kind of positive context (III. 4.) The affinity between, for
example, think and may, and their ability to take into account both positive and negative
values of a propositional content, have also been noted (Arigne, 1994:160). I shall close
this section on a last example, which is particularly interesting with regard to the level of
abstraction at which should is used:
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(23) But to return to your question:  why Jesus Christ? The answer lies in many
places.  It  lies,  before  History  brought  about  the  Incarnation,  in  logic.  We  have
talked  of  an  omnipotent  God.  An  omnipotent  God  who  loves  man.  What  more
logical than that he should show himself among men? (A. Burgess, 1980, Earthly
Powers)
Here we find a rhetorical question which leaves it to the addressee to reconstruct
the inductive reasoning along the lines of < that God should show himself among men
(that is to say the existence of Jesus Christ) is to be related to Q >. But what is more, the
reasoning does not just amount to < God shows himself among men is the result of God
loves man >. The inference, i.e. the relation < Q → P >, is already taken for granted
and the reasoning is, in fact, a comment on the degree of logic (more logical) the
inferential relation may exhibit,  should occurring here in a reflexive, or in more
technical terms, metalinguistic use: < God shows himself among men is to be accounted
for / is to be related to logic > or, in other words and as Burgess writes, the answer
lies…in logic. One notes the relationship between this particular use and examples
including such SupExps as necessary.
 
IV. 2. 2. What iterated modality expresses
33 Iterated modality can express either various successive stages of the meditative train of
thought in one speaker’s mind or the possible stands taken by subjects in a potential
conflict (cf. Behre’s “psychological meeting-ground”). Clearly, we then leave the ground
of unambiguous direct speech (III.  1.) as P can be attributed, for example, to another
subject. Moreover, the subject-subject relation (SS) may be much more complicated than
a speaker‑addressee relation (S1 / S2). This can be found for example in fiction narrative
where  the  presence  of  multiple  characters  and  a  narrator  yields  a  multiplicity  of
subjective origins, as is shown in examples such as:
(24)  Listeners  would  be  mystified,  wondering  suddenly  if  perhaps  they  weren’t
getting old or were unaccountably in the way. Of course, it is understandable that
after so many years there should be areas of collective information in which these
two could perform their mental short‑hand, but often they were startled by the
speed with which an idea passed from mind to mind. (M. Ross, 1970, The Special
Pair)
34 We see how the “polemic” element has to do with interpersonal “deontic” relations and is
conveyed by the existence of  the first  negative layer.  The piling-up of  contradictory
layers selecting first the negative then the positive value of P, sometimes relating it to a
second  explanatory  term Q,  creates  the  meditative  quality.  This  meditative  train  of
thought, which concerns itself with a causal relationship linking one term P to another
term  Q,  and  therefore  with  inter-propositional  relations,  can  be  analysed  as  the
expression  of  a  certain  kind  of  epistemic  modality,  thus  yielding  a  complex
“interpersonal epistemic” meaning28. 
 
IV. 3. Meditative-polemic should and why should 
35 The search for a reason, found at work in the whole meditative process, relates those
SupExps characteristic  of  meditative-polemic should in that-clauses to why,  an adverb
used to ask about a reason and with which should is often found. In fact, the last hybrid
modal “interpersonal (deontic) epistemic” meaning we have just analysed is also found in
some interrogative sentences in which should is associated with why in direct or reported
speech:
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(25)  There  was  no  conceivable  reason  why  I  should  have  murdered  her.
(G. Heyer, 1951, Duplicate Death)
(26)  Strange  that  these  two  joined  by  mere  marriage  should  see  each  other
incestuously.  Yet  not  so  strange  when  one  considers  the  passion  of  their
involvement. If one thinks how numerous are the primitive tribes who link through
mingling of the blood, then it is easier to see why these two should also wish for
consanguinity. (M. Ross, 1970, The Special Pair) 
(27) ‘I wanted to ask you to dinner/ Oh you did, did you?/ Why should that annoy
you?’  She shrugged again.  ‘Everyone asks me out to dinner’.  (A. Brookner,  1996,
Altered States) 
36 One  notes  in  (26)  the  similarity  between  eas[y]  to  see  why  and  the  adjective
understandable seen in III. 4. The whole meditative process unfolds through a discursive
progression, which takes us from the negative marker strange onto not so strange and
eventually to easier to understand.
 
IV. 4. Grammaticalization and evaluative modality
37 The analysis I have conducted so far shows that grammaticalization in the case of should
follows a path from interpersonal relations to inter-propositional relations, which is a
clear case of what a number of authors (after Traugott, 1989) call “subjectification”29. It
also  contributes  to  a  reassessment  of  evaluative  modality  as  expressed  in  sentences
containing should in that-clauses. The process of semantic change analysed in the previous
sections show that  evaluative modality is  grounded in interpersonal  modality (which
some  might  call  deontic  modality),  that  is  to  say  subject-subject  (SS)  relations  and
affective relations linked to a subject’s will or desire. But evaluative modality also bears a
relation to epistemicity. In fact, as has already been noted, seeing P as contrary to desire
or  expectation  in  evaluative  judgments  (strange,  unbelievable)  has  clearly  to  do  with
inferential epistemic meanings (i.e. this should be so), which are, precisely, concerned with
what is expected. It therefore provides proper foundations for meanings that may be
interpreted as being on the epistemic side (not strange, normal, inevitable). Moreover, these
meanings lead to other cases in which one goes to from P to Q in an inductive piece of
reasoning,  which  points  to  a  more  fully  “epistemic”  interpretation  (III. 6. 2.).  Lastly,
because  of  its  multistratal,  potentially  multi-subjective,  semantic  architecture,  the
expression  of  evaluative  modality  with  should,  has  to  be  analysed  in  its  discursive
dimension.
 
V. Particular uses of why…should (?) in interaction
V. 1. Deontic metalinguistic meanings: a particular kind of speech
act
38 Being interrogative, why should sentences may in some cases, and will always in direct
speech, be analysed as containing a relation < S2 → S1 > which does not belong in the
interpersonal (SS) modal domain (cf. II. and note 2 above) and can therefore be said to be
modally neutral. This neutral relation provides a ground for the reactivation of modal
interpersonal relations so that a pragmatic “intention to say” or “meaning to say” can be
attributed to S2 in a relation which I note < PragS2 → S1 > (cp. a subcategory of French
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questions beginning with “pourquoi veux-tu…?”, Milner et Milner, 1975, Arigne 1984, 1989,
Chuquet, 198630). A portion of what has been said by S2 is taken up:
(28) ‘You, er – you been there, Geoffrey? / ‘Me? But…why should I have been there?’
(K. Amis, 1978, Jake’s Thing)
(29) ‘Did he ask you to do the washing-up? / Why should he have asked me? He told
me to do it’ (Arigne, 1984)
39 The equivalence between why + you (mean to) say / think and why should can be made
explicit, as in the following example:
(30) ‘… Is she joining us?’ / Geoffrey frowned and shook his head. ‘No,’ he said with
an upward inflection. ‘Where did you get that idea from?’ / ‘I didn’t get’ / ‘I mean
why should she be joining us?’ (K. Amis, 1978, Jake’s Thing)
40 Here, the intention attributed to S2 by S1 in dialogue does not apply to the act of joining 
performed by the referent of she (should she join us?), but to the very act, performed by S2,
of conceiving an idea or a propositional content (her joining us). Hence the comment Where
did you get that idea from?, which could also have been worded as what makes you think / say
that? What is questioned here is the addressee’s will regarding what he says or has just
said or, in other words, thinks. We find an interpersonal (deontic) meaning working upon
a metalinguistic meaning, which, again, has to do with the representation of an event.
What was in III. and IV. an existential meaning positing the necessity of P (seen as the
representation of an event) shared by all is here a subjective necessity originating in a
subject’s will or desire. A speech act of the say‑type is presented as the result of will or
desire. The question is not what X means when he says that (for instance you should… as
an equivalent of I advise you to…), but why S wishes / wants / means to say that, S being
the addressee S2.
41 One should note at this stage that, as is often the case, the speech act does not need to be
explicitly quoted and the fact that one is performing the speech act is enough for it to be
referred to in the following line of dialogue. In fact, “it seems that the idea of asserting as
a speech act is so basic to our cognitive systems that we don’t even need to overtly talk
about asserting in order to negate it” (Sweetser, 1990: 11). Conversely, if the speech act is
overtly marked by a verb and therefore comes itself within the scope of should instead of
being covertly marked by it, the should-clause can no longer be a direct-speech question,
and one is brought back to ordinary meditative-polemic should (cf. Arigne, 1984: 270-272)
31:
(31) Even at he LCE, once famous for sit-ins and street demos, the barricades are
looking musty. I was discussing this with Professor Hugh Stephenson at the CEP.
‘Funny you should mention that,’ he said. (Newstatesman, 7 June 2004)
(32) ‘[…] Content you, he sent the news before ever we arrived at that house.’ ‘Why
you should suppose that should content me I do not know, but never mind!’ said
Hemingway. (G. Heyer, 1951, Duplicate Death)
42 In the case of these interpersonal-metalinguistic interpretations, it must be added that
plain subject-subject relations (SS) as well as subject-proposition (SP) relations defining
ordinary deontic meanings (II. 1.)  reappear in favourable contexts (e.g.  agentive verb
allowing the expression of a subject’s will) together with the pragmatic meaning defined
by the relation < PragS2 → S1 >.
(33) She […] swears she will report me to you and Dr. Marchant. […] And all just
because I spent half the day in London without telling her. I knew she wouldn’t let
me go — why should I tell her? And whose permission should I have sought? Yours?
(L. Durrell, 1970, Nunquam)
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43 I have no knowledge as to the period of emergence of such uses and interpretations. I can
only tentatively suggest that the phenomenon could be analysed as a case of pragmatic
enrichment. This step in grammaticalization is thought by a number of authors to be
typically  the  ultimate  stage  of  “subjectification” which emerges  later  than epistemic
inferential  meanings  (see  for  example  Traugott,  2004  among  others).  As  a  whole,
grammaticalization would here amount to a reanalysis  of  the original  subject-subject
relation seen in II. Again, in this case, we might find a measure of bleaching due to the
fact  that  a  metalinguistic  interpretation  is  usually  seen  as  a  sign  of  an  increase  in
abstractness.  Yet  along  with  this  bleaching  process,  one  must  acknowledge  one  of
resemanticization through pragmatic enrichment. Enrichment here is achieved through
persistence,  which leads to a new “spiralling” way (cf.  the cam-structure in III.  6.  3.
above) of retrieving interpersonal relations as the subjects can confront each other in this
will or intention to think or say, or “meaning to say”. These particular pragmatic uses of
should constitute a new illustration of a polemic element. 
 
V. 3. Pragmatic counterparts: may / might
44 These pragmatic uses of  should have their counterparts in two different uses of  may,
concessive may and “likely counterfactual” might. The concessive uses of may are those
found in sentences like:
(34) He may be intelligent, but I don’t like him.
45 in which may can be analysed as “I allow you to think / say”, hence < PragS1 → S2 >. I
refer  the reader  to  Sweetser  (1990:  71)  for  a  similar  analysis  in which the speaker’s
“grudging  spirit”  might  mirror  Behre’s  “polemic  element”32.  The  second  pragmatic
counterpart  is  might in  its  “likely  counterfactual”  use  (see  Charreyre,  1984,  for  a
description of “l’hypothèse-mirage”), as in:
(35) At first, catching sight of him as she passed the glass wall of the dining room,
the slight figure with its foreshortened shadow, she had given a sharp little cry.
Greg! And it might have been Greg standing there with only the street behind him.
He would have been just that age. Doubting her own perceptions,  she had gone
right  up  to  the  glass  and  stared.  But  Greg  had  been  dead  for  seven  years;…
(D. Malouf, 1985, The Empty Lunch-Tin) 
46 The sequence it might have been Greg can be paraphrased as follows: if one had not known
it wasn’t true (hypothesis + counterfactual) there was such a high degree of likelihood
that one would have been allowed to think, or it might have been legitimate to conclude…
(permission to think or say). Contrary to what happens in (34), this use of might shows no
pragmatic interaction between S2 and S1. The pragmatic permission does not originate in
a  particular  subject,  but  is  metaphorically  attributed  to  the  situation  or  the
circumstances, which could be noted : < Prag Sit  → S / Sx >. The fact that no particular or
no singular subject is involved on either side of the pragmatic relation makes this use of
might omni-personal and thus reminiscent of the SupExps found in that‑clauses (cf. III.),
while the idea of possibility inherent in the use of the verb may gives it a meditative
quality.
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V. 4. Pragmatic use of should in narrative interaction: Wh-…should…
but…!
47 The  same  kind  of  pragmatic  meaning  is  found  in  narratives  with  the  meaning  of
“narrative necessity” (for details see Arigne, 1984, 1989: 223-226) in examples like:
(36) But round the end of a cucumber frame, whom should he meet but Mr. Mc
Gregor! (B. Potter, 1902, The Tale of Peter Rabbit)
48 In such cases, the interrogative structure is used to simulate a question addressed to S2
thereby temporarily making him the origin of the necessity. Necessity here bears upon
what happens next in the story and which, at least in one case of the narrative situation
which might be considered prototypical, is only known to S1. We have a narrative SS
relation < Prag S2 → S1 >,  which can be paraphrased as I ask you: who do you think /
would you say he met? 
 
VII. A short summary
49 The preceding sections have presented an analysis of some uses of should, emphasising
the  semantic  construction  of  evaluative  modality  in  the  double  perspective  of
grammaticalization and synchronic polysemy. The meanings and processes described are
many  and  often  closely  intertwined,  making  the  meaning  of  should,  in  most  cases,
extremely elusive. This is why I shall here give a short summary of the main results and
conclusions of the study I have conducted. 
 
VII. 1. Semantic change: the generation of meanings
50 The isolation of small meaning units makes it possible to describe the transition from one
meaning to another. In the case of should, and due to the persistence of its etymological
meaning,  some  of  these  semantic  units  can  be  described  in  relational  terms.  The
description  of  semantic  change  has  shown  that  interpersonal  relations  lead  to  the
construction  of  evaluative  modality,  built  upon  an  original  < S → S >  construction
construed in the owe‑meaning of shall. The first historical instances of meditative-polemic
should are found in the uses of shall with “expressions of sorrow and displeasure” (Behre,
1950). In this case, the analysis of change has to take into account an inverted relation, as
the relation < S → P > found in he should go gives way to < P → S > or < S ← P > in …strange
that  he  should  go.  This  view  departs  from  other  theses  put  forward  on  the  subject
(Bouscaren, Chuquet & Danon-Boileau, 1987, Bybee, Perkins & Pagliuca, 1994). What are
clearly in those cases evaluative meanings lead in turn to the expression of inferential
meanings which can be said to be “on the epistemic side” (from …strange that …should…via 
…understandable  that…should…,  to  inductive  pieces  of  reasoning such as  …that…should…
shows / is due that…). Furthermore, I have suggested that, in all contemporary uses, should
bears  upon the  proposition  as  a  representation of  an  event,  as  a  metalinguistic  use
expresses the necessity of an abstract entity P (cf. “semantically empty” should (Coates,
1983);  a  “more  generalized  meaning”  (Bybee,  Perkins  & Pagliuca,  1994),  “theoretical
should” (Leech, 1971 / 1987), “putative should” (Quirk et al.).
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VII. 2. Evaluative modality as multistratal
51 Evaluative modality as expressed in should that-clauses is multistratal, combining distinct
modal meanings. The existence of a multiplicity of layers makes it possible to encompass
contradictory  meanings.  For  example,  in  …understandable  that…should…,  a  positive
evaluation is built up on the original negative one, and the semantic contradictions are
sometimes made explicit in the discursive context. The combination and, inevitably, the
fusion of the meanings combined account for the elusive character of meditative-polemic
should. The first layer remains underneath and its meaning is obscured as a result. Its
persistence  can  be  felt  as  the  polemic  element  (Behre),  reminiscent  of  the  original
subject-subject relation < S → S > . Not only do the use and meaning seen in that… should…
means that… co-exist with those of …strange that…should…,  but the latter are, somehow,
contained in the former as a ground layer. In such a perspective, “directive” contexts (
necessary, indispensable…) can be analysed as evaluative, and as instances of meditative-
polemic should. This view differs from the analysis of should as simply “harmonic” (Bybee,
Perkins & Pagliuca, 1994): S was urgent / demanded that…should… is constructed differently
from it is / was urgent that…should…
 
VII. 3. Iterated modality and modal categories
52 Iterated  modality  is  what  permits  the  multistratal  construction.  It  combines  modal
meanings and can be seen at work in one and the same use of the same word-form. For
example, should in you should go combines the two meanings of necessity and possibility,
just as should in …understandable that…should… combines two evaluative modal meanings, a
negative and a positive one. As a result, modal categories whether they are called deontic
or interpersonal, epistemic, evaluative…, are not that clear-cut in linguistic “real life”.
The  combination  of  modal  meanings  in  iterated  modality  produces  hybrid  modal
meanings,  for  example  an  “interpersonal  epistemic”  meaning  or  a  “deontic
metalinguistic meaning”. The meaning(s) of should remain(s) a puzzle unless one takes
into account the existence of iterated modal meanings, superimposed upon one another.
The meaning and function of should in its meditative-polemic uses cannot be assessed
without analysing the syntactic and semantic context, and the analysis of SupExps in the
only  means  of  unravelling  the  semantic  intricacy  of  meditative-polemic  should.  The
particular  semantic  link  between  should and  the SupExps  accounts  for  the  apparent
paradox of the interpretation of meditative-polemic should as both “désémantisé” and
“redondant” (Féraud et al., 1972: 74).
 
VII. 4. Semantic change in grammaticalization and polysemy
53 The  two principles  of  layering  and persistence  are  seen as  working  together  in  the
making up of  one and the same meaning.  They are principles  of  grammaticalization
(Hopper, 1991, Peyraube, 2002), but can also be profitably used in synchronic analysis.
The directions of change cannot be described as univocally oriented. The modal meanings
pile  up  in  a  spiralling  movement  (Culioli’s  cam-model).  Following  this  motion,  one
reaches a point referring to a state of affairs both similar to and different from the state
of  affairs  one was  facing at  the starting point  (Culioli,  1968 and note 22):  possible is
different from not impossible (note 27) just as irrelevant is different from strange or revolting
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. The linguistic description of both grammaticalization and synchronic polysemy has also
to take into account the dimension of transcategoriality. Once a main verb, the verbal
lexeme shall has become an auxiliary of deontic or epistemic modality. In its auxiliary
function, should can also be taken as a support for subordination and evaluation within a
complex sentence in a subject clause. It can also be the marker of what has been labelled a
deontic metalinguistic speech-act in direct-speech why‑questions and narrative necessity.
In the latter two cases, it acquires a metalinguistic function. As a deontic or epistemic
modal  auxiliary,  should deals  with  what  happens  in  the  world,  whereas  in  its
metalinguistic function, it bears upon representational entities of a more abstract level.
The shift from one category to another is achieved through processes of metaphorization,
with a shift in the terms related and / or changes in the orientation of the relation. 
 
VIII. Conclusion
54 The  analysis  above  offers  an  approach  of  the  verbal  form  should within  a  unified
treatment of the verbal lexeme shall. Evaluative modality is deeply rooted in subjective
interpersonal relations and has to be studied in its discursive dimension. The original
subject-subject meaning is seen as extremely pervasive in the case of shall / should, as it is
to  be  found in  all  the  contemporary  uses  whether  their  prevailing  interpretation  is
deontic,  epistemic,  meditative-polemic  or  metalinguistic.  Also,  one  sees  how  lexical
semantics, and more particularly here, the semantics of adjectives, and discourse are in
some cases closely interlinked. 
55 The semantics of should sheds light on the interfaces between different modal fields or
categories, and the possible ambiguities arising between them. The transitions from one
field to another and the possible merging or overlapping of these semantic fields should
be studied in their cognitive dimension. The analysis of the ontology of the entities
coming  under  the  scope  of  should  (cf.  Vendler,  1967,  1972;  Godard  &  Jayez,  1999)
constitute another field equally open to cognitive studies. Ultimately, one sees how some
theoretical concepts and research directions used in the two fields of grammaticalization
and synchronic  polysemy can sometimes converge and be mutually  enlightening (cf.
Robert, 2003)33.
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APPENDIXES
Symbols and abbreviations
S: subject, P: proposition
SS (relation: subject-subject relation, PS (relation) : proposition-subject relation
S1: speaker, S2: addressee, Sx: any other subject
< Sa → Sb > or < Sb ← Sa >: oriented relation in which Sa is a reference point for Sb. The
arrow is a simplified notation for Culioli’s locating operator epsilon (see for example
Culioli, 1968, 1976, Arigne, 1984, 1990, Bouscaren, Chuquet & Danon-Boileau, 1987…)
The interpersonal or relations can be linked to the two roles of speaker and addressee in
questions (are they here?: < S2 → S1 >). They can also be linked to deontic meanings (you
shall learn shorthand34: < S1 → S2 >, shall I open the door?: < S2 → S1 >) in which Sa is seen as
exerting a constraint on Sb. In the first case, the relation is interpreted as modally
neutral. In the second case, Sa exerts a constraint on Sb, which is interpreted as
“intersubjective modality” (Culioli, 1976)
SupExp: expression belonging exclusively to the superordinate clause. I have found
Behre’s term “expression” particularly satisfactory, as it is vague enough to refer to all
kinds of syntactic sequences such as is quite natural, shows (that P), is irrelevant….However,
when the SupExp is presented in its simplest form, for example in it is strange (that)
(present tense, no modulations…), the semantic study of the SupExp amounts to that of
the sole adjective strange. 
NOTES
1. The psychogenetic considerations are to be found in an ontogenetic study of modal reasoning
(Piéraut-Le Bonniec).  It  should be added that data from psycholinguistics studies in language
acquisition show that epistemic modality follows dynamic and deontic modality in spontaneous
speech (Bassano, 1996 for French and Stephany, 1986 and 1993 for English and a cross-linguistic
study)  though  a  degree  of  variation  is  exhibited  according  to  the  type  of  modality  marker
involved,  main  verbs  or  adverbs  apparently  preceding  auxiliaries  (Stephany,  1986)  and
inflections (e.g. obligatory bound-forms) appearing earlier than in non-bound forms as in Korean
(Choi, 1991, quoted in Stephany, 1993). The fact that deontic utterances precede epistemic ones
in  early  language  is  not  enough  to  conclude  that  epistemic  modality  originates  in  deontic
modality (Bassano, 1996: 108). The publications quoted above are: D. Bassano, “Functional and
formal constraints on the emergence of epistemic modality: a longitudinal study on French”, First
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Language 16,  1993;  U. Stephany,  “Modality”,  in  P. Fletcher  and  H. Garman  (eds.),  Language
Acquisition,  1986; U. Stephany, “Modality in first language acquisition: the state of the art”, in
N. Dittmar and A. Reisch (eds.), Modality in Language Acquisition, 1993; S. Choi, “Early Acquisition
of epistemic meanings in Korean: a study of sentence-ending suffixes in the spontaneous speech
of three children”, First Language 11, 1991.
2. See symbols and abbreviations at the end of the article.
3. Though apparently never in non-finite forms (Traugott, 1989: 37).
4. The term “subject” is here to be understood as referring to persons, e.g. potential speakers,
bearing in mind that these speakers may be referred to by a grammatical subject. This is the case
in the type of example X owes Y to Z currently examined, where the subject or the person who
owes is the referent of the grammatical subject who owes.
5. At least in standard contemporary English: see Visser, 1963 (F. Visser, An Historical Syntax of the
English Language) and Traugott, 1989.
6. For an analysis of ought along similar lines, see E. C. Traugott & R. B. Dasher, Regularity and
Semantic Change, 2002, p. 159.
7. A  slightly  different  type  of  analysis  is  proposed  by  Sweetser  (1990:  64)  for  the  epistemic
meaning of must (“a body of premises […] compels the speaker to reach the conclusion…” hence
< {p, q, r…} → S >)  in  which she sees  “the conventionalization […]  of  a  metaphorical  mapping
between domains”.
8. Arigne (1984, 1989) is not documented on this point. For more detail about these particular
modal meanings, see Arigne 1984, 1989 and 1990.
9. See Behre, 1950, 1955 and IV. 1. below.
10. See IV. 2. 2. for other interpretations.
11. Contra Bouscaren, Chuquet and Danon-Boileau (1987: 57) whose interpretation of should in
this type of sentence (e.g. it is surprising that he should play this concerto) is that of a constraint
exerted  on  the  grammatical  subject  of  the  subordinate  clause  (“on  peut  gloser  ainsi:  il  est
surprenant qu’il ait été amené à jouer ce concerto”). The meaning of should is therefore the meaning
found in independent clauses, restricted to SS relations (Culioli’s “intersubjective relations”), no
subject-proposition (SP) relation being taken into account. 
12. Cf. the description of should as “semantically empty” (Coates, 1983: 69) and the analysis of the
SupExps as “non-harmonic” contexts (Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca, 1994: 217-218) which, like
that of Bouscaren, Chuquet and Danon-Boileau (see note 11 above), only take into account one
orientation of the relation, that which is found in independent clauses (see also note 20).
13. Behre (1950: 281-2) also mentions one example of the use of shall “after an expression of joy,
contrasting with the use of the same auxiliary after an expression of sorrow”, as well as one
example of should (1950: 301) used “to emphasize the same kind of contrast of joy and sorrow”. 
14. This phenomenon may be akin to what is  described by Godard and Jayez (1999) in their
analysis  of  he  singular  uses  of  the  French noun fait (=  fact).  Drawing  on  Vendler’s  previous
analysis (1967, 1972) they observe that “les faits” (i.e. facts) are “des garants de propositions” (
propositional guarantees) and should not be confused with events, since a fact, far from being the
result of an event, is a representation of it (“Il est facile de confondre l’événement et le fait, parce
que le fait, loin d’être le résultat de l’événement, en est la représentation” (Godard and Jayez,
1999: 129). This analysis is grounded on a three-level distinction between i) parts of the world, ii)
propositions and iii)  propositional guarantees. If  the proposition is true, the relation to what
makes it true is constant. This relation is precisely a fact (“… si la proposition est vraie,  son
rapport à ce qui la rend vraie est constant. C’est ce rapport qui constitue un fait” (Godard and
Jayez, 1999: 126).
15. It seems that reference to abstract entities such as have been described above can be made
through a variety of devices, among which can be mentioned: the use of the verbal form should,
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the use of a noun like fait (= fact),  or again that of a verbal form in infinitive constructions,
“subjunctive”…
16. For  example,  in  meditative  processes  following  various  stages:  let  P  be  (P  is  taken  into
consideration), I don’t like P (S expresses a preference for non-P, the negative value), why not P
after all (back to P again, the positive value). 
17. Among the examples given by Hopper to illustrate the Principle of Layering, are the various
linguistic devices used in English to refer to a future or past period of time (Hopper, 1991: 23-24).
The analysis of the Principle of Persistence may well  presuppose the existence of layers,  but
these layers are not described as possibly functioning simultaneously within the same use of the
same  linguistic  item.  They  are  only  successive  stages  of  the  use  of  an  item,  each  stage
corresponding to one particular distinct meaning. Any subsequent stage is thereby analysed as a
natural development of the meaning found in the preceding stage that is to say as “a semantic
continuation  […]  of  […]  [its]  original  lexical  meaning”.  For  example,  “the  ‘predictive’  future
develops out of intention / promise use of will” and “[…] the predictive future remains only one
of the several distinct meanings in Present-Day English” (Hopper, 1991: 28-30). Similarly, Heine,
Claudi & Hünnemeyer (1991: 178) mention cases where “semantically the first stage […] co-exists
side  by  side  with  the  second  stage  […]”,  so  that  the  grammaticalization  process  involves  “
overlapping, i.e. a stage where the former meaning still exists while a new meaning is introduced”
(B. Heine,  U. Claudi  &  F. Hünnemeyer,  “From  cognition  to  grammar:  Evidence  from  African
languages” in E. C. Traugott et B. Heine, 1991).
18. Note however that, insofar as it is morphology-based (ne + *cessis from cedo), this etymology
“il n’y a pas moyen de reculer” cannot be established with certainty. Even if the morphological
analysis remains fragile, the meaning of necesse was that of “une nécessité à laquelle il est difficile
de se soustraire”, which allows for a similar semantic interpretation. The analysis of necessity as
doubly negative is also encountered in the analyses of necessity as “impossible that not” found in
Aristotelian logic.
19. These cases are not usually treated as occurrences of “meditative-polemic” or “putative”
should. Behre himself excludes examples containing SupExps like necessary on the grounds that
the “sense and function” of should is identical to “the sense and function of should in independent
clauses”, i.e. “logical inference” or “should of obligation, duty and propriety” (Behre, 1955: 16-18).
20. Bybee,  Perkins  and  Pagliuca  (1994:  214-218)  make  no  such  distinction.  In  their  analysis,
meditative-polemic should derives from directive uses after harmonic predicates such as necessary
, essential or suggest, no distinction being made between personal or non-personal predicates (the
table of predicates on page 216 is taken from Coates (1983: 69) and contains adjectives, verbs and
nouns, e.g. suggestion). This view is contradicted by Behre’s studies (1950, 1955), which show that
meditative-polemic should developed from a first use of shall in “non-harmonic” contexts. This
“non-harmonic” use of shall emerged ca. 1300, as the use of “harmonic” should seems to have
been already well-established: OED (quoted by Bybee, Perkins and Pagliuca) dates its emergence
ca. 1000 A.D. for its uses with past reference, and ca. 1200 A.D. for non-past references. They
write:  “Thus,  around  1350  there  seems  to  have  been  a  rapid  expansion  of  should into  non-
harmonic  contexts,  which  affected  complements  of  predicates  of  two  major  types:  those
expressing evaluation, and those expressing belief or opinion. While all these uses continue into
current  British  English,  their  first  appearance  in  the  language  represents  a  diachronic
progression of precisely the type we predicted — from harmonic to non-harmonic contexts.”
Note that Mélis (1998) recognizes the role of subordination as essential for the comprehension of
the  should‑subjunctive  phenomenon,  but  does  not  take  into  account  the  syntactic  difference
between subject or object complement clauses. 
21. About  tendencies  presiding  over  the  selection  of  more  emotional  or  more  intellectual
meanings, see Arigne (1984, 1989: 208-210) who examines the role played by the position (front-
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position or postposition) of the subordinate clause and the form of the SupExp (morphology,
expansion and modulations). 
22. Culioli’s  comments  have  to  do  with  the  way  natural  languages  work  in  general,  while
Peyraube is concerned with the process of reanalysis. Culioli observes that “De très nombreux
systèmes sont munis d’une structure en “came” […] Ce modèle, d’une grande importance dans les
langues  naturelles,  permet  de  mieux  concevoir  certains  problèmes  touchant  à  l’ambiguïté,
l’ambivalence  (au  sens  psychanalytique  du  terme),  et  d’une  façon  générale fait  sans  doute
apparaître une propriété fondamentale du langage”. As for Peyraube (2002: 52‑53), he writes: La
réanalyse procède par cycles.  Gabelenz (1891, p.251) avait déjà en son temps développé cette
idée, reprise plus récemment par Hagège (1978), selon laquelle le changement syntaxique n’est
pas un processus linéaire, mais plutôt cyclique, ou plus exactement qui implique un mouvement
en spirale. La raison de cette nature cyclique du changement peut être sans doute trouvée dans la
relation dialectique qui existe entre les besoins de simplicité de la communication, d’un côté […]
et de l’autre côté, à l’opposé, les besoins d’expressivité maximum” (the references in Peyraube
are Die Sprachwissenschaft; Ihre Aufgaben, Methoden und bisherigen Ergebnisse for Gabelenz et “Du
thème au rhème, en passant par le sujet; vers une théorie cyclique” for Hagège).
23. Note that  other adjectives  would take us further along the “spiral”  of  meanings.  Just  as
irrelevant and insignificant are both similar to and different from strange or revolting, adjectives
built on the semantic pattern of relevant or significant belong in some way with SupExps like not
strange,  (quite)  natural and  understandable:  P  signifies  something / points  to  Q,  but  Q  is  not
mentioned.
24. Most probably accounting for the label of “a more generalized meaning” given by Bybee,
Perkins  and Pagliuca (1994:  218)  who write  that  “should retains  its  older  meaning in certain
contexts while it expresses a more generalized meaning in other contexts”.
25. See for example “Backtracking Counterfactuals and Iterated Modalities”, a recent paper given
by A. Arregui at the Congress of Syntax and Semantics in Paris (CSSP) in 2005.
26. See also (5) in III. 4. (…though puzzled, I had complied. […] Now, I understood. […] It was perfectly
understandable, I told myself, that I should dress appropriately…).
27. About the role played by interrogative constructions for better acceptability, see for example
Kruisinga & Erades, 1950, on the difference between *it is possible (that… should) and is it possible?
(E. Kruisinga and P. Erades, An English Grammar, 1950, quoted in Behre, 1955: 30). See also Arigne
(1984, 1989) about differences in pairs such as it  is  possible / it  is  possible  after  all,  possible / not
impossible, and also about the way *it is conceivable (that…should) differs from it is conceivable after
all (that… should).
28. For the difficulty inherent in pinpointing this specific modal meaning, see section III. above,
and more particularly note 24.
29. Duchet,  studying the path from radical  to  epistemic meanings of  the present  form shall,
writes  that  shall has  not  completed  the  grammaticalization  process.  Note  however  that  he
mentions other epistemic uses of shall (“d’autres emplois épistémiques de shall”), among which
the use of should found in why should he think that?, seen close to the use of should in It is strange
that you should say that (J. L. Duchet, “Shall, ou l’histoire d’une grammaticalisation manquée”, in
J. L. Duchet  &  L. Danon-Boileau  (éds.),  Opérations  énonciatives  et  interprétation  de  l’énoncé,  1993,
p. 108).
30. Chuquet (1986: 81-82) draws a parallel between why should-questions (why should we leave?)
and infinitive why-questions (why leave?).
31. Similarly, this kind of pragmatic interpretation seems generally precluded in interaction if
any evaluation attributed to S2’s previous words comes within the scope of should: cp. Of course
she would / *why should you say that/ *why should you be so sarcastic about it? vs. I don’t see why you
should be so sarcastic about it (Arigne, 1984: 270-272).
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32. Sweetser (1990:  70)  proposes paraphrases on the model  of:  “I  do not  bar from our (joint)
conversational world the statement that he is […], but…”
33. I wish to thank Eithne O’Neill for her comments upon one of the very last versions of this
paper. Errors are of course my own. 
34. Jean Stubbs, 1972, Call me again the Day that is Past.
ABSTRACTS
This  article  addresses  the  question  of  iterated  modality  from  the  twofold  perspective  of
grammaticalization and polysemy through the semantic description of various uses of should in
contemporary English, and more particularly that of “meditative-polemic should”. Distinct modal
meanings  can  be  found together  within  the  same use  and meaning.  Possibility  accompanies
necessity, and evaluative modality is shown to be multistratal owing to the two principles of
layering and persistence at work within the same use and meaning. The combination of distinct
modal meanings yields hybrid modal meanings pertaining to different modal categories.  The
dimension of transcategoriality is also taken into account: should is either an auxiliary of deontic
or epistemic modality, or used metalinguistically as a support for subordination and evaluation,
or as the marker of a “deontic speech-act”.
Cet  article  aborde  le  problème  de  la  modalité  itérée  dans  la  double  perspective  de  la
grammaticalisation et de la polysémie au travers de la description sémantique de divers emplois
de should en anglais contemporain, et en particulier celle du “meditative-polemic should”. Des
valeurs modales distinctes sont présentes ensemble dans le même emploi. Le possible se combine
au nécessaire, et la modalité appréciative est analysée comme stratifiée, ce dont rendent compte
les  deux  principes  de  stratification  et  de  persistance  à  l’œuvre  au  sein  d’une  même  valeur
sémantique.  La combinaison de valeurs  modales  distinctes  est  à  l’origine de valeurs modales
hybrides appartenant à des catégories modales différentes. L’analyse prend également en compte
la  dimension  de  transcatégorialité:  should est  tantôt  un  auxiliaire  de  modalité  radicale  ou
épistémique,  tantôt  utilisé  de  façon  métalinguistique  comme  support  de  subordination  et
d’appréciation ou comme marqueur d’un “acte de langage radical”.
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